H e w orked in various defence m in istries for 32 years b u t he also had a spell of 10 years in th e A tom ic E nergy A u th o rity , w orking first on nuclear w eapons and second on reacto r d ev elo p m en t and en gineering. W h en he retired from th e M in istry of D efence in 1970, he w en t into in d u stry and m ade som e im p o rta n t co n trib u tio n s, notab ly w ith R olls-R oyce and the RB211 aircraft engine.
M u ch of his w ork was secret and to u n d e rsta n d w hat he did, w ith o u t going into the secrets, it is necessary som etim es to explain w hat the national defence policy was at th e tim e. H e was a good applied m ath em atician b u t he d id n o t w rite scientific papers. H is han d iw o rk , to those w ho know , can be traced in c o n trib u tio n s he m ade to the effectiveness of th e w eapons and e q u ip m en t of o u r fighting services and to som e im p o rtan t civil technology as well.
E arly years W illiam R ichard Jo sep h C ook was b o rn in T ro w b rid g e, W iltsh ire, on 10 A pril 1905, the eldest son of Jo h n and Eva Cook B oobyer). Jo h n Cook w orked on the railw ay as an inspector. T h e re w ere tw o o th er ch ild ren , an u n m a rried d au g h ter, Stella Cook, w ho becam e h ead m istress of a Ju n io r School, and an o th er son, L ionel Cook, w ho died in the 1940s. C ook's school career was p rom ising. H e first atten d ed T ro w b rid g e T rin ity School and th e n th e T ro w b rid g e B oys' H ig h School, w here in 1917 he gained high m arks in F ren ch and m ath em atics. In th e O xford Local E xam ination he gained d istin ctio n in m ath em atics, h ig h er m athem atics and physics an d was aw arded first class h o n o u rs division 1. A letter dated 1922 from W iltsh ire C o u n ty C ouncil to his fath e r aw arded W illiam a U n iv ersity S ch o larsh ip as a resu lt of g aining a H ig h e r School C ertificate w ith D istin c tio n in G ro u p I I I m ath em atics, and reco rd s 'y o u r boy was quite easily th e to p of th e list for th e co u n ty in th a t p a rticu la r g r o u p '. H e w ent to B ristol U n iv ersity and in 1925 gained a B .Sc. w ith firstclass hon o u rs in m ath em atics, specializing in ap p lied m ath em atics. In 1926 he took a D iplo m a in E d u catio n and in 1927 an M .S c. degree w ith a d issertatio n on 'T h e forces betw een atom s and io n s '. A t this tim e he was w orking as a research assistan t to P rofesso r H . R. H asse an d was doing som e lecturin g . In ad d itio n he u n d erto o k som e v o lu n tary w ork for P rofessor J. E. L e n n a rd Jones on th e d eterm in a tio n of in term o lecu lar fields and equations of state in gaseous m ix tu res. E vidence show s th a t he was highly reg ard ed as a lectu rer. H e was on the po in t of applying for a teach in g p o st in 1928 w hen he decided in stead to jo in the Scientific Civil Service. H is p o stin g was to th e ex tern al ballistics section of th e R esearch D e p a rtm e n t of W oolw ich A rsenal.
Ba l l is t ic s and r o c k et s, 1928-45
C o o k 's early w ork resu lted in th e d ev elo p m en t o f th e C ook C am era, specifically to find the reason for th e p o o r accuracy of th e Royal N a v y 's new trip le 6 inch gun m o u n tin g an d tu rre t. T h e cam era, w hich co n tain ed a ro tatin g d ru m w ith m u ltip le lenses, had to be m o u n te d on b o ard ship and involved difficult p ro b lem s in spatial geom etry. T h e cam era show ed th a t the inaccuracy was being caused by th e in terferen ce of th e blast waves from the th ree m uzzles. T h e rem ed y was to delay th e firing of th e m iddle gun by a few m illiseconds.
In 1935, Cook tran sferred to w ork on rockets and becam e second in com m and to D r C row (later S ir A lw yn C row ). T h e h ig h -p rio rity p ro g ram m e was to develop a 3 inch a n ti-airc ra ft rocket m issile to cover the serious gaps in the defence of th e co u n try against attacks by aircraft, caused by the delays in p ro d u cin g th e 3.7 inch AA gun. T h e m issile becam e know n as th e 3 inch u n ro ta tin g projectile. T h e p ro ject ran into difficulties in 1938 w hen th e chosen design involving the b o n d in g of the cordite to the o u ter case was show n to fail catastro p h ically u n d e r te m p eratu re cycling. W ith g reat drive and energy, C ook d irected a crash p rogram m e to correct the fault, involving th e firing of m an y h u n d re d s of rockets. E ventually th e 3 inch U P AA m issile system w en t into service in 1940/41 and the first b attery sited in C ard iff was co m m an d ed by D u n can Sandys.
O ne of C o o k 's colleagues at W oolw ich was D r S. G . H o o k er (later S ir S tanley H ooker). H o o k er was one of the m any people in th is co u n try w ho w ere b ecom ing ap p reh en siv e by 1935 th a t a second dev astatin g w ar in E u ro p e was possible. H e was at O x fo rd at th e tim e b u t he d ecid ed to jo in th e A d m iralty lab o rato ries at T e d d in g to n , w here he w ro te a p ap er on su p erso n ic w ind tu n n e ls. As a resu lt o f ideas ex plained in this p ap er, he was tra n sfe rre d to th e D irecto rate of B allistic R esearch at W oolw ich A rsenal to w ork on an ti-a irc ra ft rockets u n d e r W . R. C ook, w here, it was ju d g e d , H o o k e r's ideas w ould be valuable. T h u s began a frien d sh ip and a technical co -o p eratio n w hich was resu m ed 30 years later in the re c o n stitu te d R olls-R oyce com pany.
W h en W o rld W ar II began, th e rocket p rojectile d e p a rtm e n t was m oved from W oolw ich to F o rt H alstead n ear Sevenoaks, and again in 1940 to A b e rp o rth to be n eare r to th e firing te st-ra n g e. A t th is tim e, C row set u p his office in S h ell-M e x H o u se as C o n tro ller of P rojectile D ev elo p m en t, w ith C ook as D e p u ty C o n tro ller. C ook was deeply involved in finding and d eveloping new ap plications for th e 3 inch rocket projectiles. T h e m o st m ilitarily effective was th e firing of th e rockets from h ig h -sp eed aircraft.
In 1943 C ook becam e involved in th e In tellig en ce assessm ents of in fo rm atio n on G erm an lo n g -ran g e rocket develo p m en t. T h e in fo rm atio n ap p eared to be confused. C o o k 's calculations w ere based on the a ssu m p tio n th a t th e G erm an s w ould use slo w -b u rn in g co rd ite as the p ro p ellan t because this was know n to be used in th e ir rocket w ork. T h e assu m p tio n led to im possibly big and heavy m issiles, w ith range of less th a n 100 m iles. A lth o u g h P ro fesso r L u b b o ck had in fact d em o n strated th e feasibility of a liq u id -fu elled rocket m o to r based on p etro l and liquid oxygen, L o rd C herw ell an d C row stro n g ly arg u ed against th e p ra c ti cability of developing a m o to r for a lo n g -ran g e rocket because o f the difficulties of p u m p in g such liq u id into a co m b u stio n ch am b er w ith very high in tern al p ressu res and tem p eratu res. C herw ell, C row and C ook w ere w rong, for th e G erm an V2 rocket was fuelled w ith liq u id oxygen and alcohol p u m p e d by a sm all cen trifu g al p u m p . H ow ever, all the assessm ents of w arh ead size based on solid p ro p ellan ts w ere far larger th a n th e 1 to n w hich the V2 actually carried and the overall effectiveness was th erefo re far less th a n had been dread ed . In retro sp ect, it is in terestin g to note th a t C row and C ook's view on th e use of a solid fuel for m ilitary system s was confirm ed som e 20 years later w hen m ost longrange m issiles changed to solid p ro p ellan ts. T o w ard s th e en d of th e w ar, atten tio n was focused on m eth o d s of g u id in g rockets, p articu larly in the a n ti-airc ra ft role. C ook took charge of this w ork, m u ch of w hich was based on a test vehicle fuelled by liq u id oxygen and petrol, L O P /G A P .
I m m ed ia te po stw a r d e f e n c e : W e s t c o t t , 1946-47 W hen the E urop ean phase of th e w ar en d ed , A m erican, B ritish and Soviet team s g rab b ed as m any G erm an rocket scientists and atom ic scientists as they could find, as well as a g reat deal of rocketry hard w are. W hen the F ar E astern phase en ded, m ilitary m en realized th a t th e n atu re of w ar had changed. T h e technologies of rad ar, electronic circu itry , guidance system s, lo n g -ran g e m issiles and n u clear w arheads w ould all be m ade m ore effective and w ould be co m b in ed into w eapons system s w hich could th rea ten the survival of civilization. In tern a tio n a l politics d egenerated into th e C old W ar.
P rim e M in iste r C lem en t A ttlee decided in early 1947 th a t B ritain w ould m ake nuclear w eapons w ith to p p rio rity . M ilitary leaders attach ed a sim ilar p rio rity to certain types of rockets. W ork on n u clear w eapons m ade a slow start b u t it d id steadily g ath er m o m en tu m . R ocketry nev er had enough staff or resources to p ro d u ce resu lts in any way com p arab le w ith those expected from th e su p erp o w ers.
T h e M in istry of S u p p ly created a new rocket d ev elo p m en t e stab lishm ent at W estco tt, and C ook becam e th e first D irecto r. A lth o u g h the C hiefs of Staff had decided th a t th e U n ite d K in g d o m could n o t afford to develop a long-ran g e m issile, they w an ted to have a range of gu id ed m issiles in service. W ith th ree separate Service M in istries and b u d g ets th ere w ere th ree different staff req u ire m en ts, each w ith d ifferent guidance and p ro p u lsio n system s; and all these m o to rs w ere to be developed at W estcott.
St J. E lstu b (later S ir St Jo h n E lstu b ) was C o o k 's d ep u ty at W estco tt and in his 1974 P resid en tial A ddress to th e In stitu tio n of M echanical E ngineers ( P r o c e e d i n g s (1974) 188, 395) he relates th e follow ing sto ry :
W orking for Bill C ook was a highly stim u latin g experience by any stan d ard . H e never spared h im self and epitom ized the old adage 'W ork hard , play h a r d '. H e w ould never take ' N o ' for an answ er, unless he was convinced th at the reasons w ere valid, and som etim es n o t even th en . A t one stage o u r p ro g ress was lim ited by o u r inability to re cru it staff quickly en ough. Bill Cook conceived the idea th a t th ere m u st be m any people w ho had been rejected by the Civil S ervice C o m m issio n ers for o th e r jo b s, p erh ap s for good reasons, w ho m ig h t be suitable for o u r p urposes. H e w rote to ask if we could have access to th e ir files. T h e reply cam e back th a t they were over-w o rk ed and u n d er-staffed , and c o u ld n 't possibly m eet o u r request. Bill th en offered to do the jo b w ith his ow n staff, if we could have access to th eir offices over a w eekend. T h is was a difficult one to refuse, and the outcom e was th at at lu n ch -tim e one S atu rd ay Bill and I and a few senior colleagues tu rn ed up at B urlington G a rd en s, and took over the H e a d q u a rte rs of the Civil Service C om m issioners. W e sorted th ro u g h m any h u n d re d s of ap p lications and cam e away w ith a h u n d re d or so th at w ere w o rth follow ing up. As a resu lt o f this o p eratio n we filled a n u m b e r of key posts and W e stco tt got off the g ro u n d m o n th s earlier th an w ould otherw ise have been possible. C o o k 's tim e as D ire c to r o f W estco tt was n ot a h ap p y one. T h e re was c o n tin u o u s arg u m e n t ab o u t th e best choice for m o to rs and his advice was largely ignored. It was a p erio d of m u ch d isa p p o in tm e n t and fru stratio n .
A d m ir a l t y and D R P C , 1947-54 S ir F red eric k B ru n d re tt, chief of the Royal N aval Scientific Service (C R N S S ) realized th a t W estc o tt was n o t going to get eno u g h resources to achieve as m u ch as had been hoped, and he arran g ed in 1947 th a t Cook sh o u ld m ove and becom e D ire c to r of Physical R esearch in th e A d m iralty . C ook soon saw the im p o rtan ce of new d ev elo p m en ts in u n d erw ate r w arfare and of su b m arin e detectio n , and he in itiated w ork w hich was to resu lt in considerab le im p ro v em en ts.
Cook succeeded B ru n d re tt in 1950 w hen B ru n d re tt becam e D ep u ty C h ief Scientific A dviser in the M in istry of D efence, rep o rtin g to S ir H en ry T iz a rd . T iz a rd had accepted at th e b eg in n in g of 1947 a fiveyear fu ll-tim e ap p o in tm e n t as ch airm an b o th of th e A dvisory C ouncil on Scientific Policy (i.e. civil science) and of the D efence R esearch Policy C o m m ittee (nuclear w eapons being excluded). W h en the C onservatives, led by C h u rch ill, w ere re tu rn e d to pow er in the O cto b er 1951 election, T iz a rd quietly com p leted his five-year a p p o in tm e n t and retired from W hitehall.
S ir Jo h n C ockcroft was th en ap p o in ted C h ief Scientific A dviser to the M in istry of D efence on a p a rt-tim e basis; his o th e r jo b was D irecto r of H arw ell. H ow ever, the arran g em en t proved u nsatisfactory. Even C ockcroft could n ot m anage tw o such busy jo b s at th e sam e tim e. In 1954 B ru n d re tt was given the top jo b and C ockcroft w ent back fu ll tim e to H arw ell.
W h en B ru n d re tt becam e th e C h ief Scientific A dviser, he asked Cook to be th e chairm an of the staflF side of th e D efence R esearch Policy C o m m ittee (D R P C ), w ith a seat on the C o m m ittee. T h e first B ritish atom ic test had taken place in O cto b er 1952 b u t w ithin four m o n th s had been overshadow ed by P resid en t E isen h o w er's an n o u n cem en t th a t th e U n ite d S tates had m ade the w o rld 's first full-scale th e rm o n u cle ar test at Eniw etok in N o v em b er 1952. A few m o n th s later, in A ugust 1953, the Soviet U n io n declared th a t the U n ite d S tates no longer had a m onopoly of the H -b o m b ; th e Soviet U n io n also had successfully m ade a test. C h u rch ill had already asked C herw ell to see w hat could be done. C herw ell, in fact, had been p ressin g P en n ey for som e tim e to start w ork on th e 's u p e r -b o m b ', b u t w ith this new im p etu s C herw ell spoke to P enney again and also to C ockcroft, w ho at th e tim e was C hief Scientific A dviser to th e M in istry of D efence. H e was to ld th a t the d evelopm ent of an op eratio n al H -b o m b w ould be a costly u n d e rta k in g and th a t it was beyond th e reach of the atom ic energy p ro ject as it th e n was.
C herw ell on an o th er fro n t increased his efforts to take atom ic energy out of the Civil Service. H e spoke in confidence to som e of th e m ost influential politicians of b o th of the m ain political p arties and got a favourable hearing.
In M arch 1954, th e U n ite d States began a test series o f five th e rm o n u cle ar explosions. T h e first test, called Bravo, ow ing to a change in w ind directio n co n tam in ated a Jap an ese fishing b o at an d th ree sm all islands. T h e U n ite d S tates press, follow ed by th e w orld press, estab lish ed th a t the explosion had been en o rm o u s co m p ared w ith earlier atom ic bom bs. T h e A m ericans said th a t th ey had m ade a large m ilitary advance.
C herw ell again spoke to P enney, this tim e in a d ifferent m ood. H e said th at he th o u g h t th at th e B ritish G o v e rn m e n t w ould soon have to d ecided to m ake th e H -b o m b . T h e su p er-p o w e rs w ould m ake series of tests and w ould th en declare a m o rato riu m . P en n ey said he w ould p riv ately try to m ake som e plans.
T h e full B ritish C ab in et decided in Ju ly 1954 th a t B ritain w o u ld m ake H -b o m b s b u t cautiously th e decision was n o t an n o u n ced u n til the follow ing F eb ru ary in th e W h ite P ap er on D efence (C m d. 9391).
T h e A tom ic E nergy A u th o rity cam e into existence in A u g u st 1954. T h e m ost u rg en t need was to find som ebody able to share th e load w ith P enney of ru n n in g th e w eapons w ork. P en n ey th o u g h t th e b est m an was Cook. T h e opinion of S ir G eoffrey T ay lo r was sought. T a y lo r knew the A dm iralty scientists well and he gave his w arm approval. P en n ey w en t to B ru n d re tt and he agreed. C ook was su m m o n ed and offered the jo b . H e accepted im m ediately.
Cook began w ork at A ld erm asto n on 1 S ep te m b er 1954; he learn t very quickly and before long he was asking w h at his special resp o n sib ilities w ere to be. A greem ent was re a c h e d ; C ook w ould co n cen trate his efforts on designing the H -b o m b . C ook chose th e m em b ers of a W eapons D evelopm ent C om m ittee w hich he w ould chair, to plan and p rogress th e developm ent w ork, and later to plan tests w hich w ere co n sid ered essential.
Penney and Cook w ould talk at length to each o th e r tw o o r th ree tim es a week keeping the o th er in fo rm ed of w hat he was doing and in a b ro ad er context, trying to u n d e rsta n d w h eth er n u clear w ar could h ap p en . T h e y tried to think about w hat becam e know n as 'th in k in g th e u n th in k a b le '.
As tim e w ent by, w arn in g s k ep t on com ing fro m th e F o reig n Office th a t a test m o ra to riu m had again b eg u n to look possible. E ven if we had held o u r first th e rm o n u c le a r tests b efore a m o ra to riu m began to o p erate, the tests m ig h t n o t have been eith er successful or definitive. W h at was need ed was a fall-back p o sition. P en n ey and C ook, w ith A ld erm asto n b eh in d th em , felt co nfident th a t w ork w hich had been in p ro g ress for som e tim e, dev elo p in g a lig h terw eight physically sm aller fission b o m b , w ould be successful. T h e M aralin g a range in A u stralia was being b u ilt to test th is new device, as well as for m akin g som e p ro o f tests of th e first p ro d u c tio n atom ic w eapon. It w ould be possible quickly to ex ten d th e w ork to m ake a light w eight fission b o m b w hich w ould be co n sid erab ly g reater in yield th an the earliest atom ic b o m b s. T h is new device w ould be expensive in fissile m aterial, b u t in a w eapon system w ith accurate delivery, B ritain w ould still have a fo rm id ab le d e te rre n t.
T h e idea was p u t to B ru n d re tt. H e expressed scepticism ab o u t th e im m in en ce of a m o ra to riu m b u t he accepted th e general te n o r of th e a rg u m e n t and he liked th e idea of h aving a fall-back possibility. If he could be given a g u aran tee th a t th e w ork w ould in no w ay affect the d ev elo p m en t of th e H -b o m b , he w ould seek ap p ro v al in th e M in istry for th e suggestion. T h e assu ran ce was m ade, ap p ro v al was given and th e task was ad d ed to th e rem it of the W eapons D ev elo p m en t C o m m ittee at A ld erm asto n .
L a te r on, th e C o m m ittee also w orked on th e design of w arheads for battlefield n u clear w eapons, and sketch plans of req u ire m en ts w ere m ade in th e M in istry of D efence. H ow ever, none of these was p u t into p ro d u ctio n , n o r indeed was th e 'fa ll-b a c k ' device.
T h e first th e rm o n u cle ar explosions w ere m ade n ear M ald en Island, so u th of C h ristm as Islan d , in M ay and Ju n e 1957. C ook was th e scientific d irec to r of these tests. T h e devices w ere d ro p p ed in a b o m b case by Vb o m b e rs and w ere exploded high in th e air. T h e tests in clu d ed th e ' fall b a c k ' device. F u rth e r th e rm o n u cle ar devices w ere tested in A pril 1958 and A u g u st-S e p te m b e r 1958. T h e se w ere th e last B ritish tests in th e atm osphere. By th en , a conference of o u tsta n d in g in tern atio n al im p o rtan ce had b eg u n in G eneva, th e E a st-W e st C onference of E x p erts to co n sid er the p ossibility o f d etectin g and id en tify in g violations of a possible nuclear te st-b a n treaty . In O cto b er 1958 the U n ite d States, the Soviet U n io n and th e U n ite d K in g d o m agreed to a m o rato riu m on nuclear te sts; it lasted u n til S ep tem b er 1961.
T h e U n ite d S tates in th e a u tu m n of 1957 app ro ach ed the U n ite d K in g d o m w ith an inv itatio n to explain the p o sition w hich had been reached in th e technology and design of B ritish n u clear w eapons, w ith a h alf-p ro m ise th a t if th e position was technically good, collaboration in nuclear w eapons m ig h t be resu m ed in areas w here b o th sides had a stated in terest. A p resen tatio n was m ade and was favourably received. T h e follow ing year, an in ter-g o v ern m en tal ag reem en t began to operate (C m nd. 733), and it im m ediately becam e im m ensely im p o rta n t to th e U n ite d K ingdom in all areas of n u clear defence, and has rem ain ed so ever since.
R eactors and e n g in e e r in g , Cook becam e M em b er for E n g in eerin g and P ro d u ctio n in th e A tom ic E nergy A u th o rity on 1 F e b ru a ry 1958. (T h e G ro u p in those days was called the In d u strial G ro u p .) C ook follow ed S ir C h risto p h e r H in to n (later L o rd H in to n of B ankside), w ho had left the A u th o rity in S ep te m b er 1957 to becom e the ch airm an of a new B oard, the C en tral E lectricity G en eratin g B oard, w hich was form ed as p art of a reo rg an ized electricity supply in d u stry . T h e re was an in te rre g n u m in the A u th o rity betw een H in to n and Cook, and the G ro u p was te m p o rarily led by S ir L eo n ard O w en, the D ep u ty M an ag in g D irecto r.
T h e reasons for th e in te rre g n u m are m ostly to be fo u n d in th e critical events h ap p en in g in the W eapons G ro u p , as already explained. H ow ever, th ere was one im p o rta n t ad d itio n al reason. O n 10 O cto b er 1957 a serious accident o ccu rred in th e n u m b e r 1 pile at W indscale. T h e resu ltin g fire was not extinguished u n til 12 O cto b er. T h e A u th o rity im m ediately sent an internal com m ittee to m ake an in q u iry , and an ab rid g ed re p o rt of the in q u iry was p u b lish ed and gave g ro u n d s for the A u th o rity to ask S ir A lexander Fleck (later L o rd Fleck), th e th e n C h airm an of Im p erial C hem ical In d u stries, to m ake reco m m en d atio n s ab o u t the org an izatio n of th e In d u strial G ro u p and ab o u t th e p ossibility of p u ttin g all A u th ority health and safety m a tters into an in d e p en d en t A u th o rity -w id e organization.
T h e recom m endatio n s m ade by Fleck resu lted in a sep aratio n of p ro d u ctio n away from th e In d u stria l G ro u p , and in Ju ly 1959 Cook becam e M em b er for D ev elo p m en t and E n g in eerin g and O w en becam e M em b er for P ro d u ctio n . A fu rth e r reo rg an izatio n took place in A pril 1961, w hen C ook's G ro u p split into tw o, the R eactor G ro u p and th e E ngineering G ro u p , w ith C ook leading the R eactor G ro u p .
Cook found th a t the tw o to p -p rio rity areas of th e w ork of his G ro u p w ere going well. T h e rate of p ro d u ctio n of m ilitary m aterial was acceptable to the M in istry of D efence. T h e W indscale accident had little if any effect on the p lan n ed p ro g ram m e for th e fo u r reactors at C ald er H all or on the o th e r four being b u ilt at C hapel C ross. T h e u ra n iu m isotope separation p lan t at C a p en h u rst was giving no p roblem s.
T h e o th e r to p -p rio rity d u ty was to give w hatever su p p o rt was requested by th e civil n u clear pow er p ro g ram m e, based on th e M agnox reactors being developed from th e C ald er H all reactors. Cook took this d u ty seriously b u t it m ade little d em an d on his tim e. L a te r on, a p ro b lem did arise on fuel rattlin g , b u t this was satisfactorily solved. G ra p h ite technology was im p o rta n t to th e civil p ro g ram m e and it was also im p o rta n t to th e A u th o rity for o th e r types of reacto r w ith w hich the A u th o rity was co n cern ed . T h e A u th o rity m a in tain ed a co n sid erab le effort for m any years in th e R esearch G ro u p and in th e G ro u p led by C ook. In due course, th e C E G B la b o rato ry at B erkeley c o n trib u te d to th is w ork.
Cook sp en t m o st o f his tim e on reacto r d ev elo p m en t. H e in h e rited a difficult situ atio n . C o ck cro ft and H in to n in early 1957 began to argue ab o u t w here th e d em arcatio n line sh o u ld be d raw n b etw een the In d u stria l G ro u p and th e R esearch G ro u p . H in to n said th a t th e design and co n stru c tio n of any p o w er-p ro d u c in g reacto r b u ilt as an early stage of a possible com m ercial pow er reacto r sh o u ld be th e resp o n sib ility of his G ro u p . C ockcro ft d isagreed and said th a t th e R esearch G ro u p sh o u ld acq u ire a new site on W in frith H eath in D o rse t w here en g in eerin g rigs, zero -en erg y assem blies and u p to fo u r or five lo w -p o w ered ex p erim en tal reactors could be b u ilt, testin g various co m b in atio n s of coolant, m o d e ra to r and fuel. T h e sto ry is to ld in volum e 14 (1968) of Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society in th e m em o ir on C ockcroft. T h e u p sh o t was th a t th e R esearch G ro u p got th e W in frith site. T h e first ex p erim en tal reacto r to be b u ilt th e re w ould be th e in tern atio n al h ig h -te m p e ra tu re reacto r (H T R ) called Dragon and sp o n so red by th e E u ro p ea n N u clear E nergy A ssociation (E N E A ). E u rato m was one of the p articip an ts.
H in to n in Ju ly 1957 p u t th e case to th e A tom ic E n erg y E xecutive for a p ro to ty p e advanced gas-cooled reacto r to be b u ilt at W indscale (W A G R ) and he d escrib ed the A G R as a logical d ev elo p m en t of the M agnox reactors. T h e E xecutive ap p ro v ed and th e case w en t on to the A u th o rity in O cto b er 1957, w hen it was ap p ro v ed , a m o n th after H in to n had left th e A u th o rity .
T h e A u th o rity was th erefo re engaged in d eveloping th ree new reactor system s: the A G R , w hich at th a t tim e th e A u th o rity saw as the successor to M agnox in th e B ritish n u clear pow er p ro g ra m m e ; the fast reactor (F R ), w hich was seen as an essential system for the long te rm because it o b tain ed far m ore energy fro m n atu ral u ra n iu m th an any o th e r sy stem ; and the H T R , w hich was seen as having a som ew hat n eb u lo u s position in the m iddle. S im ple and sensible th o u g h this schem e m ay seem , th ere w ere m any senior people in the A u th o rity w ho w ere n ot satisfied. T h ey w anted a w ater system to be developed as well.
T h e re w ere th ree possible w ater system s, tw o of w hich w ere A m erican lig h t-w ater system s, th e p ressu rized w ater reacto r (P W R ) and the boiling lig h t-w ater reacto r (B W R ). T h e n th ere was th e system being developed by th e C anadians using heavy w ater as th e m o d e ra to r and w hich becam e know n as C A N D U . T h e C anadian system could be taken fu rth e r along several possible lines.
T h e A u th o rity had several key staff, m ostly in the R esearch G ro u p , w ho had w orked in th e M o n treal lab o rato ry and at th e reacto r site at C halk R iver, d u rin g and after the tim e w hen C ockcroft was th e D irecto r. As these staff re tu rn e d to th e U .K ., good co llab o ratio n w ith th e C anadians was m ain tain ed , b u t w hen com m ercial in terests began to ex ert an effect, the collaboration red u ced to a low level. A n o th er p art of this com p licated story is th a t th e m a ritim e in d u stry , w ith a good deal of p u b lic in terest and su p p o rt, was u rg in g th a t B ritain should develop a reacto r for special types of large m e rc h a n t ships. 'B ritain was a m aritim e natio n w hose ships carried o u r in tern atio n al trade. W e m u st find o ut if n u clear pow er m ade ship p ro p u lsio n cheap er. ' So ran the arg u m en t.
T h e m ost suitable type was th e P W R . O f course, th e reacto r w ould be m u ch sm aller th an th a t for a n u clear pow er statio n , b u t th e technology w ould be closely sim ilar. T h e N avy was in d eed p re p a rin g to p ro d u ce P W R s for nuclear p ro p u lsio n . U n d e r th e 1958 D efence A g reem en t, th e U n ite d K in g d o m neg o tiated the tran sfer of th e U n ite d S tates su b m arin e technology, b u t only on co n d itio n th a t th e tech nology was n o t passed to the B ritish civil n uclear pow er p ro g ram m e, o th e r th a n safety m atters. A tim e w ould com e, how ever, w hen B ritish in d u stry w ould have to m ake P W R s for nuclear su b m arin es, albeit in secret con d itio n s.
T
h e R eactor D ev elo p m en t Policy C o m m ittee m et m o n th ly at Risley, w ith Cook in the chair. T h e m eetings becam e p ro v erb ial.
T h e y began at 9.00 a.m . and often w ent on till 7.00 p .m . or even later. T h e m in u tes w ere always circulated w ith in 24 ho u rs.
A great deal was achieved b u t n o t m u ch show ed im m ediately o u tsid e th e G ro u p . T h e corrosion of g rap h ite in A G R co n d itio n s in d icated a risk th a t the g rap h ite stru c tu re w ould n o t last th e req u ire d w orking life of 25-30 years. A rem edy was fo u n d b u t it took tim e and co n sid erab le effort.
Cook always stressed th a t th e acceptance of th e A G R d ep en d e d on attractive capital and g en eratin g costs, an d p u t this d ic tu m into th e developm ent w ork. T h e design of th e fu el-p in assem bly h ad a considerable effect on u n it costs, an d this p artic u la r co m p o n en t received a lot of atten tio n . T h e 3 6 -p in clu ster finally ad o p ted owes m u ch to C ook's drive.
T h e re was u n certain ty in the early A G R days w h eth er b ery lliu m or stainless steel should be used for th e fuel cladding. B eryllium , if it could be fabricated successfully an d if it p erfo rm e d well, w ould offer cost reductions in electricity u n it costs. B eryllium was given a fair trial, b u t efforts to m ake it less b rittle failed and b ery lliu m w ork was sto p p ed .
T h e fast reactor at D o u n reay was lan g u ish in g even before the accident at W indscale, because staff w ere so badly n eed ed for th e sh o rt-te rm u rg en t w ork elsew here. T h e accident m ade m a tters w orse. C ook, as soon as he could, stren g th en ed th e staff at D o u n reay . T h e R eactor D ev elo p m ent C om m ittee, w ith a stro n g lead from C ook, decided th a t th e core should be replaced w ith a new design. N ew fuel pins, w hich w ould be of th e sam e size and capacity as th e p in s th a t w ould som e day be used in a civil pow er reacto r, w ere to be developed. T h e pow er level of th e reacto r was to reach its original desig n ed o u tp u t of 60 M W th. T h e core w ould be a te st b ed for fuel d ev elo p m en t, and high b u rn -u p w ith safety was essential. All th is was successfully achieved. T h e reacto r first o p erated at full design pow er in Ju ly 1963. Several co u n tries h ired space in th e reacto r core in o rd e r to m ake irrad iatio n tests on specim ens of fuel of th e ir ow n m a n u fa ctu re. P relim in a ry design w ork started on th e p ro to ty p e fast reacto r b u t approval for c o n stru ctio n was n o t so u g h t u n til F eb ru a ry 1966, after C ook h ad left th e A u th o rity .
C ook d id n o t a tte m p t to ru sh m aking a decision on w h eth er or n o t to b u ild a p ro to ty p e w ater-p o w er reactor, b u t he m ade a con sid erab le effort to assem ble as m u c h in fo rm atio n as he could. H e stre n g th e n e d the frien d ly relations w ith th e C an ad ian s and in due course th e A u th o rity m ade an exchange ag reem en t by w hich th e A u th o rity o b tain ed valuable in fo rm atio n on com m ercial term s. A co llab o ratio n ag reem en t was m ade w ith th e V ulcain p ro ject in B elgium on a sp ectra l-sh ift sm all P W R suitable for m arin e p ro p u lsio n . T h e w ork was technically successful b u t it was b ro u g h t to an en d w h en it becam e clear th a t th e re was no d em an d in B ritain for nu clear p ro p u lsio n o f m e rc h a n t ships. (T h e Soviet U n io n co n tin u ed w ith its highly successful ice breakers, b u t th e circu m stan ces th e re w ere exceptional and favoured n u clear pow er.)
T h e R eactor G ro u p was m aking a succession of sketch designs of w ater reactors and calculating as well as they could th e capital and u n it costs. T h e decision was u ltim ately m ade th a t th e A u th o rity sh o u ld be asked to approve th e c o n stru ctio n of a steam -g en eratin g heav y -w ater reacto r (S G H W ) at W in frith . T h e in ten tio n was d escrib ed in th e A u th o rity su m m ary of reacto r policy, a d o cu m en t specially p rep ared annually for discussion w ith th e ch airm an of C E G B , w ho at th a t tim e was still H in to n . H in to n had read the d o cu m en t carefully and in his co m m en ts said th a t he was glad th e A u th o rity was going to b u ild a w ater reactor. It was one of th e im p o rta n t d u ties of th e A u th o rity to have w orking experience of w a ter-rea cto r technology. W h e th e r the S G H W was th e b e st choice he did n o t know . O nly tim e w ould tell. T h e C E G B in a few y ears' tim e w ould invite te n d ers for a new nu clear pow er statio n to follow th e M agnox stations. T h e A G R w ould be a stro n g co m p etito r b u t so m ig h t ten d ers based on th e A m erican P W R and the A m erican B W R , and possibly also th e C anadian C A N D U . T h e S G H W w ould n o t be ready to com pete at th a t tim e b u t it could well prove b est in later co m petitions.
W ith this cautious b u t h elpful statem en t to encourage th em , the A u th o rity w ent ahead and a G o v ern m en t decision th a t a 100 M W e S G H W w ould be b u ilt at W in frith was an n o u n ced in F eb ru ary 1963.
C ook was invited in early 1964 by S ir Solly Z u ck erm an (later L o rd Z uckerm an), C hief Scientific A dviser to the M in istry of D efence, to re tu rn to the M in istry of D efence as one o f his tw o d ep u ties. C ook took som e tim e in reaching a decision. H e had co m m itted the A tom ic E n erg y A u th o rity to som e expensive reacto r d ev elo p m en ts and he felt an obligation not to leave at th a t m o m en t, w hen som e of th e m had h ard ly begun. H ow ever, he was at h eart a 'D e fe n c e ' m an and th ere was an u rg en t jo b to be done.
Cook spoke to P enney, w ho was by th en ch airm an of the A tom ic E nergy A u th o rity . P enney said th a t if Cook th o u g h t he sh o u ld go, he should go. P enney w ould n o t refer th e m a tte r to M in isters.
M in is t r y of d e f e n c e , 1 9 6 4 -7 0
Cook w orked as one of th e tw o d ep u ties to Z u ck erm an , over th e p erio d 1 9 6 4 -6 7 .
L o rd Z u ck erm an w rites: U n til 1963 th e A d m iralty , the W ar Office and the A ir M in istry w ere separately and in d ep en d e n tly responsible both for n eg o tiatin g th e ir b u d g ets w ith the T re a su ry and for fram in g th eir R & D p ro g ram m es, w hich it had been hoped w hen W o rld W ar II ended, could be co o rd in ated by an In te rService D efence R esearch Policy C o m m ittee th a t was set up in 1946. T h e D R P C was not, how ever, accorded adeq u ate a u th o rity to p re v en t m ajo r d u p licatio n -for exam ple, tw o Services em b ark in g on separate R & D p ro jects to satisfy a sim ilar operational re q u irem en t. T h e inevitable co n sequence was th a t the total defence R & D b u d g e t becam e grossly overloaded. C o n siderable sum s of m oney w ere w asted as projects had to be cancelled before they w ere com pleted.
T h e p u rp o se of the m ajor defence reorganization of 1963-64, the m ost far-reach in g th a t had been a tte m p te d this ce n tu ry , was to c u rb the in d ep en d en ce of the Services, and to vest in a S ecretary of S tate for D efence full executive au th o rity to decide all m atters th a t affected the shape, size and eq u ip m en t of o u r arm ed forces. C en tral O peratio n al R eq u irem e n ts and W eapons D ev elo p m en t C o m m ittees w ere set up, w ith each S ervice from th en on having to argue the case for a new p roject before a single in te rS^fvice body th a t re p o rted b o th to the C hiefs of S taff and directly to the S ecretary of S tate. T h e se C o m m ittees cam e u n d e r the C h ief Scientific A dviser, w ho in ad d itio n was p u t in overall charge of an in ter-S erv ice D efence R esearch C o m m ittee, and of an estab lish m en t th a t b ro u g h t to g eth er the separate O p erational R esearch team s of the Services.
T o help th e C SA carry the new b u rd e n s th a t the reorganization im posed, two d ep u ty C SA posts w ere created, the first to deal w ith operational re q u irem en ts and projects, and the second to assist w ith additional m atters th at cam e w ith in his sphere o f responsibility. Cook was p ersu ad ed to leave th e A tom ic E nergy A u th o rity to fill the first of the tw o new posts. (P rofessor A lan C o ttrell was ap p o in ted to the second.) H e took office in 1964, tw o m o n th s before the L ab o u r P arty replaced the th en C o n servative G o v e rn m en t. T h e w orsening financial state o f the co u n try was m aking it inevitable th a t m ajor cuts w ould co n tin u e to be m ade in the eq u ip m en t p ro g ram m e of the th ree Services. A n u clear ballistic m issile k n o w n as B lue S treak had been cancelled in 1960. T h e A m erican airlau n ch e d n u clea r m issile system know n as S kybolt, w hich the U .K . had th e n h o p ed to b uy, was cancelled by th e U .S .A . at th e end of 1962, and as a rep la cem e n t, W a sh in g to n agreed to o u r p u rc h asin g th e su b m arin elau n ch ed P o laris system . E arlier th a t sam e year, a sh o rt-ra n g e arm y g ro u n dto -g ro u n d n u clea r m issile system th a t w ent by th e nam e of B lue W a te r had h ad to be cancelled. B ut d esp ite th e cancellations th a t had already been m ade, th e R & D and p ro c u re m e n t p ro g ram m e s w ere still well bey o n d w hat c o u ld .b e afforded. O u r airc raft d ev e lo p m e n t p ro g ram m e was a p a rtic u la r difficulty. T h e m ajo r item th a t was causing co ncern was th e T S R 2 , a fighter b o m b e r w hose d ev e lo p m e n t had all b u t been co m p leted . It, to g e th e r w ith a sh o rt tak e-o ff tra n sp o rt and su p erso n ic vertical tak e-o ff plane, was cancelled by th e new L a b o u r G o v e rn m e n t only a few m o n th s after it took office.
T h is ro u g h ly , was th e situ atio n w hen C ook becam e d ep u ty C SA . H e im m ed iately show ed his m e ttle in h elp in g to deal w ith the diso rg an izatio n th a t follow ed all these cancellations. In place of the T S R 2 the G o v e rn m e n t first em b ark ed on an A n g lo -F re n c h p ro ject to b u ild a v aria b le-g eo m e try fig h ter b o m b er. T w o years after the F re n c h w ith d raw al from th is p ro jec t in 1967, we en te re d into a co n so rtiu m w ith the G e rm a n and Italian G o v e rn m e n ts to b u ild a fighter b o m b er. T h e re w ere d isag reem en ts ab o u t th e specification o f th e airc raft and th re a ts to th e co n tin u atio n of th e co n so rtiu m . B ecause of his u n d e rsta n d in g of the reasons for, and the difficulties o f th e strin g e n t specifications, C ook c o n trib u te d p ro m in e n tly to th ese neg o tiatio ns. T h e re su lt is th e T o rn a d o of today.
A n o th er tro u b le d p ro ject th a t C ook helped save was the an ti-a irc ra ft system now k now n as R apier. D ev elo p m en t of a m o re so p h isticated version o f th is w eapon had been sta rte d in the later 1950s, u n d e r the co d e-n am e P T 4 2 8 , and cancelled in 1962. T h e B ritish A ircraft C o rp o ra tio n th en used th e ir ow n reso urces to co n tin u e the d ev elo p m en t of a m odified and sim plified form of the system u n til g o v ern m e n t s u p p o rt was once again fo rth co m in g . Several th re a ts of cancellation still o cc u rre d , b u t once again C ook h elp ed to keep the p rp ject alive. T h e outcom e is the R ap ier system of today.
T h e highly controversial D efence R eview of 1966 led to the resignation o f C h risto p h e r M ayhew , the N avy M in iste r, and of the F irst Sea L o rd , A d m iral S ir D avid L uce, and th e T h ird Sea L o rd , A d m iral S ir F ran k H o p k in s. As C SA I was opposed to certain re co m m en d atio n s of the R eview , and co n seq u en tly resigned m y post of C h ief Scientific A dviser, m oving to th e C ab in et Office as C h ief Scientific A dviser 'to the G o v e rn m en t as a w h o le '. C ook and A lan C o ttrell th en w orked as co-equals for eighteen m o n th s. W h en C o ttrell resigned to jo in m e in the C ab in et Office, C ook becam e 'C h ief A dviser, P rojects and R e se a rc h ' u n til his re tire m en t in 1970 fro m th e M in istry of D efence and from public service. D u rin g his rem ain in g years as the C h ief Scientific A dviser to M O D , he co n tin u ed to deal w ith operational re q u irem en ts and project develo p m en t as well as w ith n u clear m atters. T h e initial studies th a t resulted in the C hevaline p ro g ram m e of n u clear w arhead 'h a r d e n in g ' w ere carried o u t d u rin g this perio d .
T h ro u g h o u t his tim e in th e M in istry of D efence, C ook d em o n strate d all those ch aracteristics for w hich he was already re n o w n e d -d e te rm in a tio n , atten tio n to detail, and leadership. H e was highly resp ected by his staff, and also by his Service and civil service colleagues.
L o rd Z u ck e rm an 's acco u n t includes C o o k 's w ork in th e M in istry of D efence after Z uck erm an left to becom e Scientific A dviser 'to th e G o v ern m en t as a w hole ', a jo b w hich involved h im as a scientific adviser on certain im p o rta n t D efence m atters. A slightly fuller acco u n t o f som e of C ook's w ork d u rin g this p erio d is as follows.
W hen Z u ckerm an m oved, C ook replaced h im as ch airm an of th e D efence E q u ip m e n t Policy C o m m ittee, a d escen d an t of th e old D R P C . As such he review ed all m ajo r d ev elo p m en t p ro g ram m es. T h e new title th a t Cook assum ed in 1968, C h ief A dviser (P rojects and R esearch) m ore accurately suited his d uties. H is task was to get ag reem en t to a realistic and settled R and D p ro g ram m e. H is experience w ith m ilitary pro jects recognized the need to avoid w asteful d u p licatio n and th e need to con cen trate b o th in d u strial and in tern al resources into larger u n its th a t could com pete nationally an d in tern atio n ally in te rm s of q u ality , cost and tim e scale. S im ilar m oves w ere being m ade in o th e r N A T O co u n tries, and Cook helped to reorganize th e N A T O A rm am en ts o rg anization, h oping th a t it w ould prove to be a fru itfu l fo ru m for co -o p eratio n in research and developm ent.
T h e great cost of m any D efence pro jects an d th e fact th a t B ritain was in the N A T O alliance caused th e B ritish g o v ern m en t and th e M in istry of D efence w herever possible to favour pro jects w here several N A T O and o th er co u n tries com b in ed to g eth er. R eaching ag reem en t on such p ro jects involved a great deal of w ork and m u ch give and take from all the D efence m inistries of th e p u ta tiv e p artn e rs. O n th e B ritish side, C ook played an im p o rtan t p art, and so did o th ers, in several such projects. T h e re was bilateral co -o p eratio n w ith F ran ce on a g ro u n d -a tta c k aircraft, the Jag u ar; th ere was th e F ran co -B ritish dev elo p m en t of th ree m ilitary h e lic o p te rs; th ere was an A m e ric a n -A u stra lia n -C a n a d ia n -B ritish developm ent of a battlefield co m m u n icatio n system called M allard (cancelled w hen the U n ite d States w ith d rew ); and a G e rm a n -Ita lia n -B ritish developm en t of a tow ed 150 m m how itzer. T h e n , as already m en tio n ed by L o rd Z u ck erm an , th e re was th e M u lti-R o le -C o m b a t A ircraft (M R C A ), later called th e T o rn a d o .
Cook su p p o rted national p rojects w here th e re was no p ro sp ect of co operation and w here he th o u g h t they w ere ju stified by tim e scale, cost and perform ance. H e strongly su p p o rte d the N avy co n cep t of th e th ro u g hdeck cru iser and the d ev elo p m en t of a battlefield an ti-airc ra ft gu id ed w eapon. W hen this latter w ork ran into severe difficulties of delay and cost and m u tu al interferen ce, C ook carried o u t a critical review resu ltin g in the acceptance of an initial low er stan d ard . T h e p ro ject eventually becam e the R apier system th a t was used in th e F alklands conflict. E arly in 1967, th e U n ite d S tates in v ited a B ritish team led by Z u ck e rm an , P en n ey an d C ook to visit W ash in g to n to discuss antiballistic m issile system s. F ro m w h at was learn t, th e M in istry of D efence began a six -m o n th stu d y to review critically th e effect on P olaris and to suggest op tio n s for im p ro v em en t. In som e resp ects th e situ atio n resem b led th e w artim e arg u m e n t ab o u t G erm an lo n g -ran g e rocket d ev elo p m en t. Som e of th e p a rticip a n ts, fro m b o th co u n tries, d o u b te d the cred ib ility of th e S oviet A B M system an d o th ers, from b o th co u n tries, p erh ap s o v er-stressed its possible effectiveness. T h is tim e, C ook p u t all his stre n g th b eh in d th e n eed to rem ed y som e im m ed iate v u ln erab ilities in th e P olaris system , and to m ake a stu d y o f space d ev elo p m en ts to defeat possible A B M system s. S u ch w ork, after m u c h a rg u m e n t and discussion, began in 1969 and involved u n d e rg ro u n d n u clear tests in 1970 and eventually led to th e C h evaline system . C ook retired fro m th e M in istry of D efence in m id -1970, b u t he c o n tin u ed for a fu rth e r 10 years to ch air n u clear safety com m ittees, a role he had taken over in 1964. E ven w hen he gave up th e ch airm an sh ip in 1981, he c o n tin u ed to act as a special co n su ltan t and was doing assessm ent w ork on irrad iatio n effects on steels as late as tw o m o n th s before his su d d en d eath. -Royce, 1971-80 T h e follow ing account of C o o k 's p art in rescuing the R olls-R oyce R B 2 1 1 engine from cancellation and his su b se q u en t w ork for Rolls Royce is based on tw o closely sim ilar statem en ts p ro v id ed by S ir St Jo h n E lstu b and L o rd K eith of C astleacre.
Rolls
F ollow ing the R olls-R oyce b an k ru p tc y in 1971, L o rd C arrin g to n , the S ecretary of S tate for D efence, in v ited Cook to ch air a co m m ittee of th ree, im m ediately called the 'co m m ittee of th ree wise m e n ', to reco m m en d w h eth er th e RB211 engine sh o u ld be co n tin u ed . T h e o th er tw o m em b ers w ere an in d u strialist S ir St Jo h n E lstu b and a d istin g u ish ed professor of engineering, P ro fesso r D . W . H o ld er of O x ford U n iv ersity . T h e tim e allow ed was only th ree weeks. C ook th erefo re co n cen trated on a few aspects w hich th e th ree ju d g e d w ere likely to prove the lim iting factors and investigated these in som e d e p th -notab ly the h ig h -p ressu re tu rb in e blades.
T h e cost estim ate to co m p lete th e engine p ro d u ced by th e firm of accountants b ro u g h t in by th e G o v e rn m e n t was as pessim istic as th e previous R olls-R oyce estim ate h ad been o p tim istic, and th e re w ere political p ressures for the engine to be ab an d o n ed . T o his cred it C ook resisted these p ressu res w ith the resu lt th a t the R B 2 1 1 an d its derivatives are now the backbone of th e R olls-R oyce civil p ro g ram m e.
W hen the g o v ern m e n t-o w n ed co m pany R olls-R oyce (1971) L td was form ed, K eith was ap p o in ted ch airm an and am ong th e o th e r d irecto rs w ere Cook, E lstu b and H ooker. C ook m ade a sp len d id c o n trib u tio n to th e reform ing of this fam ous com pany.
P art of C ook's w ork involved him in au d itin g the en g in eerin g effort on all new projects, and by his astu te q u estio n in g and co n stru ctiv e criticism he w on the confidence of th e en g in eerin g staff and h elp ed to keep th e com pany at the leading edge of en g in eerin g achievem ent. C ook retired from his d irecto rsh ip in 1976 b u t he co n tin u ed to give som e help to th e com pany for an o th er four years. 
M arconi and British Telecom
C ook's duties w ith M arco n i as a D ire c to r do n o t seem to have been onerous. H e acted m ore as a co n su ltan t or senior adviser on m a tters w here his long experience in D efence was relevant.
In B ritish T eleco m , he was a co n su ltan t to th e C h airm an on th e size and duties of the h ead q u a rters staff w hen p riv atizatio n was being planned.
P erso n al
Cook was elected to the Royal Society in 1962. H e was ap p o in ted C.B. in 1951, K n ig h t B achelor in 1958 and K .C .B . in 1970. H e had h o n o rary degrees from the U n iv ersity of S trath cly d e (1967) and th e U n iv ersity of B ath (1975) .
Cook m arried G race P u rn ell in 1929. T h e re was one d au g h ter from th e m arriage, Betty Cook. T h e m arriag e en d ed in divorce in 1939.
Cook m arried G ladys A llen in 1939. T h e re was one son, R o b ert A nthony, from the m arriag e and one d au g h ter, E lizab eth M ary , w hose m arried nam e is W rig h t.
Bill and G ladys Cook w ere very h ap p y to g eth er. T h e y p referred to sp en d w h atev er tim e Bill h ad free from w ork q u ietly to g e th er in th e ir hom e n ear N ew b u ry . D u rin g th e day, G lad y s w ould often jo in o th er w ives in an o u tin g an d a lu n ch . O ccasionally, th ey w ould invite in a few frien d s for a d rin k or a m eal and they w ould go to a d u ty d in n e r and alw ays seem ed to enjoy them selves. W h en ev en tu ally G la d y s's h ealth began to fail, Bill looked after h er d ev o ted ly and d id all th e housew ork and th e cooking. W h en G lad y s h ad to m ove to a n u rsin g hom e, Bill lived on his ow n. H e d ied in W e stm in ste r H o sp ital after a m assive stroke from w hich he never recovered consciousness. T h e p h o to g rap h re p ro d u c e d was taken in ab o u t 1960 by th e A tom ic E n erg y A u th o rity .
